Abstract We build concurrently executable blind signatures schemes in the common reference string model, based on general complexity assumptions, and with optimal round complexity. Namely, each interactive signature generation requires the requesting user and the issuing bank to transmit only one message each. We also put forward the definition of universally composable blind signature schemes, and show how to extend our concurrently executable blind signature protocol to derive such universally composable schemes in the common reference string model under general assumptions. While this protocol then guarantees very strong security properties when executed within larger protocols, it still supports signature generation in two moves.
Introduction
Blind signatures, introduced by Chaum [Cha83] , allow a bank to interactively issue signatures to users such that the signed message is hidden from the bank (blindness) while at the same time users cannot output more signatures than interactions with the bank took place (unforgeability). Numerous blind signature schemes have been proposed, mostly under specific number-theoretic assumptions, some relying also on the random oracle model [PS00,Abe01,BNPS03,Bol03] and some forgoing random oracles [CKW04, KZ05, Oka06] . Only the work by Juels et al. [JLO97] addresses the construction of blind signatures under general assumptions explicitly, and deploys general two-party protocols and oblivious transfer based on trapdoor permutations.
Interestingly, almost all of the aforementioned blind signature schemes require three or more moves (most of them even in the random oracle model) and concurrent executions of the signature generation protocol are often a concern (cf. [Poi98, PS00, Oka06] ). For instance, making the solution by Juels et al. [JLO97] concurrently secure would require a high round complexity. This follows from results by Lindell [Lin03, Lin04] showing, among others, that in the plain model the number of rounds in blind signature schemes with black-box security proofs is bounded from below by the number of concurrent executions.
A notable exception to the problems with interleaving executions are schemes with an optimal two-move signature generation protocol, solving the concurrency problem immediately. This includes Chaum's original RSA-based blind signature protocol and the pairing-based discrete-log version thereof [Bol03] . Unfortunately, the security proofs [BNPS03, Bol03] for these schemes need the random oracle model -by which they can bypass Lindell's lower bound for the plain model-and rely on the so-called one-more RSA or one-more discrete-log assumptions, which are less investigated than the corresponding standard problems.
Here we show that one can build secure blind signature schemes with a two-move signature generation protocol under general assumptions (namely, trapdoor permutations and, depending on the level of unforgeability, also collision-resistant hash functions). Our scheme does not rely on random oracles, yet to bridge the lower bound on the number of rounds we work in the common reference string model. We note that instead of falling back on general multi-party paradigms as in [JLO97] and inheriting the round complexity of the underlying oblivious transfer protocols for general assumptions we give a dedicated solution to the blind signature problem.
Construction Idea. The basic (and simplified) construction idea of our blind signature scheme is as follows. The user commits to the message m and sends this commitment U to the bank. The bank signs U with a (strongly unforgeable) signature scheme and sends the signature B back to user. The user finally derives the blind signature for m by computing a commitment 1 C of U ||B and proving with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π (based on the common reference string) that this commitment C contains a valid signature B for U and that U itself is a commitment of the message m. The blind signature to m is given by the commitment C and the proof π.
Using standard non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs our protocol above would provide a weaker unforgeability notion than postulated in [PS00, JLO97] . That is, a malicious user could easily generate several signatures from a single interaction with the bank by generating multiple proofs π 1 , π 2 , . . . for the same commitment C. All these pairs C||π i would be valid blind signatures for the same message m, while the standard unforgeability definition asks that a malicious user cannot create more signatures than interactions happened.
Fortunately, we can indeed turn the above idea into a scheme supporting the desired unforgeability level by using so-called unique non-interactive zero-knowledge (UNIZK) proofs, recently introduced by Lepinski et al. [LMS05] and shown to be realizable under the quadratic residuosity assumption. For such unique proof systems there is a bijection between the witnesses w to a theorem x and the valid zero-knowledge proofs π, guaranteeing together with the uniqueness of the commitment C that there is only a single valid proof for each signature interaction.
Here we only need a relaxation to so-called single-theorem unique zero-knowledge (sUNIZK) proofs, in which uniqueness and zero-knowledge hold simultaneously for one theorem only (but each property individually remains true for an unbounded sequence of theorems), As briefly mentioned in [LMS05] , this relaxation enables constructions of such proofs for 3SAT based on trapdoor permutations, and here we show how to build such proofs under the same assumption for CircuitSAT. Since we deploy such sUNIZK proofs mainly as a tool to achieve the strong security guarantees of our blind signature protocol, most of the details about sUNIZK proofs are delegated to the appendix.
Universal Composition. As explained, our two-move signature generation protocol overcomes the concurrency problem effortlessly. More general a slight variation of our scheme yields a secure blind signature scheme in the universal composition (UC) framework [Can01] . Secure schemes in this UC framework enable interdependent executions with other protocols while preserving the main security characteristics. Our modified scheme now requires the same assumptions as before as well as a simulation-sound NIZK proof of knowledge, which can also be derived from trapdoor permutations [Sah99,DDO
+ 01].
Towards proving the universal composability result we first formalize an ideal functionality F BlSig , prescinding the basic requirements of blind signatures such as completeness, unforgeability and blindness. Since such UC blind signatures can be used to build UC commitments it follows from an impossibility result in [CF01] that UC blind signatures cannot be realized through two-party protocols in the plain model. But, as our solution shows, augmenting the model by common reference strings one can build UC blind signatures (against non-adaptive corruptions) under general assumptions. Compared to general feasibility results in the UC framework [CLOS02] , showing that essentially any functionality can be securely realized in the common random string, our solution still needs only two-moves to generate signatures.
Blind Signatures in the Common Reference String Model
In this section we briefly introduce the underlying tool, single-theorem UNIZK proofs, and their construction for CircuitSAT; more details can be found in Appendix A. We then recall the security definition of blind signatures and finally present our two-move solution and prove its security.
Single-Theorem UNIZK Proofs
Lepinski et al. [LMS05] recently introduced the notion of unique non-interactive zero-knowledge (UNIZK) proofs. For such unique proof systems the prover in mode key first generates a public-key PK and then uses the corresponding secret key in mode prove to generate zero-knowledge proofs π i for an unbounded (but polynomial) number of subsequently chosen statements x i and witnesses w i . Uniqueness says that, once the key PK has been chosen, for each statement x i there is exactly one valid proof π i per witness w i .
Here we consider single-theorem unique zero-knowledge (sUNIZK) proofs, briefly touched in [LMS05] , where the prover's public key PK allows to prove exactly one theorem x such that the proof is zero-knowledge and unique at the same time. Uniqueness still holds if several statements for the same key PK are proven but then the proofs may not be zeroknowledge anymore. Vice versa, the system should still be multiple zero-knowledge in the sense of [FLS99] , i.e., one can proof several statements x i in zero-knowledge for the same common random string, but then the prover must choose a new key PK i for each proof (and each proof is individually unique with respect to PK i ).
Single-theorem UNIZK proofs obey first of all the three basic properties of regular NIZK proofs: completeness, soundness and (unbounded) zero-knowledge. We omit a formal definition of these properties as they are standard. To formalize the (single-theorem) uniqueness we follow [LMS05] and define uniqueness by a bijection between witnesses and valid proofs (if any). To this end we parameterize the underlying N P relation R by the common reference (or random) string crs, generated by an algorithm C, and the public key PK. These parameters are both themselves determined according to a complexity parameter n, and for such parameters R crs,PK takes as inputs x ∈ {0, 1} χ(n) and w ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) , where x, w may depend on crs, PK. Let W crs,PK (x) = w ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) R crs,PK (x, w) = 1 denote the set of witnesses to x with respect to crs and PK.
Definition 1 (Single-Theorem Unique Zero-Knowledge). A NIZK proof (C, P, V) for relation R is a single-theorem unique NIZK proof system if the following holds:
Uniqueness. With overwhelming probability over the choice of crs ← C(1 n ), for any PK and any x, if the set Π crs,PK (x) = {π | V(crs, x, PK, π) = 1 } of accepted proofs in not empty, then there exists a bijection τ crs,PK,x between the set Π crs,PK (x) and the set W crs,PK (x) = {w | (x, w) ∈ R crs,PK } of witnesses.
As pointed out in [LMS05] such sUNIZK proofs are easier to construct than general UNIZK proofs, and an appropriate modification of the NIZK protocol with preprocessing in [DMP88] gives a solution for 3SAT which obeys single-theorem uniqueness under general assumptions. Our construction instead follows the one by Damgȧrd [Dam93] for CircuitSATwhere one should decide for a given circuit C n and value x ∈ {0, 1} χ(n) whether a satisfying input w ∈ {0, 1} ω(n)
for C n (x, ·) exist. The advantage of CircuitSAT over 3SAT, pointed out in [Dam93] , is that it allows to prove N P statements directly without reductions to 3SAT. Yet, compared to the solution in [Dam93] using the quadratic residuosity assumption to derive possibly ambiguous proofs, our goal is to use general assumptions and to achieve uniqueness. Details can be found in Appendix A; here we merely state the main result:
Single-theorem unique non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for relation R C = (x, w) ∈ {0, 1} χ(n)+ω(n) C n (x, w) = 1 in the common random string model exist if (regular) non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for N P in the common random string model and one-way permutations exist.
The proposition holds for both bounded and unbounded provers. For efficient provers it follows that sUNIZK proofs for CircuitSAT exist if trapdoor permutations exist, and for unbounded provers they can be built from any one-way permutation [FLS99] .
Blind Signatures and Their Security
For the interactive signature generation protocol of a blind signature scheme we introduce the following notation. For two interactive algorithms X , Y we denote by (a, b) ← X (x), Y(y) the joint execution of X for input x and Y for input y, where X 's private output at the end of the execution equals a and Y's private output is b. For an algorithm Y we write Y given that k interactions with the honest bank took place (where the adversary adaptively decides on the number k of interactions). Blindness says that it should be infeasible for a malicious bank B * to determine the order in which two messages m 0 , m 1 have been signed in executions with an honest user. This should hold, of course, as long as the interactive signature generation produces two valid signatures and the bank B * for example does not abort deliberately in one of the two executions.
Definition 3 (Secure Blind Signature Scheme). A blind signature scheme BS = (C BS , KG BS , B, U , Vf BS ) in the common reference string model is called secure if the following holds:
Unforgeability. For any efficient algorithm U * the probability that experiment Forge BS U * (n) evaluates to 1 is negligible (as a function of n) where
and Vf BS (crs BS , pk BS , m i , S i ) = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1, and at most k interactions with B(crs BS , sk BS ), · ∞ were initiated.
Blindness. For any efficient algorithm B * (working in modes find, issue and guess) the probability that experiment Blind BS B * (n) evaluates to 1 is negligibly close to 1/2, where
In a partially blind signature scheme [AF96] the bank and the user first agree on some information info which is attached to the blind signature. There, unforgeability demands that a malicious user cannot find k + 1 distinct but valid tuples (info i , m i , S i ). The definition of blindness then allows a malicious bank to determine info together with the messages m 0 , m 1 such that the bank still cannot decide the order in which the users execute the issuing protocol for info, m 0 and info, m 1 , respectively. Jumping ahead we note that we can easily turn our blind signature scheme into a partially blind one.
In a weaker unforgeability requirement we only demand that the messages m 1 , . . . , m k+1 output by the malicious user are distinct (instead of stipulating distinct message-signature pairs). Clearly, the unforgeability notion in Definition 3 implies this weaker requirement. For our scheme this relaxation also allows to dismiss unique zero-knowledge proofs and to use regular NIZK proofs instead.
Construction
The high-level idea of our blind signature protocol is as follows. To obtain a blind signature from the bank the user commits to the message m and sends this commitment U to the bank (where the commitment has the additional property of unique randomness). The bank signs the commitment with a regular but strongly unforgeable signature scheme (KG Sig , Sig, Vf Sig ) and returns the signature B to the user. The user derives the blind signature for m by computing another commitment C of the signature B together with U , and a unique noninteractive zero-knowledge proof π showing the validity of C.
We have already remarked that single-theorem UNIZK proofs are sufficient for our purpose. This is because we can let the user generate a new key PK at the beginning of each interaction and have PK included in the commitment U . The twist here is that we use a hash function H from a family H to hash down the key PK to a short string of length h(n). This is necessary as we later use PK in the statement x for the zero-knowledge proof and because the length of PK is determined as a function of the length of x itself. Using the h(n)-bit hash value overcomes this dependency.
For the same reason as in the case of PK we also assume that the signature scheme is lengthinvariant, i.e., that public keys pk Sig as well as signatures for security parameter n are all of the same length s(n). We note that this can always be achieved by standard padding techniques, and strongly unforgeable, length-invariant signature schemes exist if one-way functions exist [NY89, Rom90, Gol04] .
We furthermore assume that the commitment scheme (C Com , Com) in the common random string model, given by algorithms C Com generating the string crs Com and algorithm Com(crs Com , ·, ·) : {0, 1} 2n+h(n) ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} c(n) mapping strings from {0, 1} 2n+h(n) with n-bit randomness to commitments, is length-invariant, too. That is, the reference strings as well as commitments are all of length c(n) for parameter n. We also need that the commitment scheme has unique openings, i.e., with overwhelming probability over the choice of crs Com ← C(1 n ) there do not exist (z, r) = (z , r ) with Com(crs Com , z; r) = Com(crs Com , z ; r ). Such commitment schemes can be derived for instance from one-way permutation based pseudorandom generators.
In order to turn the above idea into a provably secure scheme the proof π needs to allow extraction of U and B encapsulated in C. We accomplish this by using an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme (KG Enc , Enc, Dec) to "commit" to U ||B in C, where the public key pk Enc of the encryption algorithm becomes part of the common reference string.
2 We presume that the encryption scheme is also length-invariant and that public keys pk Enc and ciphertexts C ← Enc(pk Enc , U ||B; v) for U ||B ∈ {0, 1} c(n)+s(n) and randomness v ∈ {0, 1} n are all of length e(n). This is again without loss of generality.
The circuit C BS n for parameter n we consider for the sUNIZK proof takes as input strings x = C||pk Enc ||crs Com ||pk Sig ||H(PK)||m of bit length χ(n) = c(n) + 2e(n) + h(n) + s(n) + n and w = u||v||B of length ω(n) = 2n + s(n), and returns an output bit which is determined as follows. The circuit is built from the descriptions of algorithms Com, Enc, Vf Sig and checks for the signature's verification algorithm that Vf Sig (pk Sig , Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u), B) = 1 and that the value C equals the ciphertext Enc(pk Enc , Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u)||B; v). If and only if both tests evaluate to true then the circuit outputs 1. The corresponding relation is given by R
Construction 1 (Blind Signature Scheme). Let (KG Sig , Sig, Vf Sig ) be a signature scheme, (KG Enc , Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme, (C Com , Com) be a commitment scheme, H be a hash function family and let (C uni , P, V) be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for R BS . Define the following four procedures: Signature Issue Protocol. The interactive signature issue protocol is described in Figure 1 .
Signature Verification. The verification algorithm Vf BS (crs BS , m, S) parses the signature S as S = C||PK||π and returns the output V uni (crs uni , PK, x, π) for the value x = C||pk Enc ||crs Com ||pk Sig ||H(PK)||m. Theorem 2. Let (KG Sig , Sig, Vf Sig ) be a length-invariant signature scheme which is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, (KG Enc , Enc, Dec) be a length-invariant IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, (C Com , Com) be a length-invariant non-interactive commitment scheme with unique openings in the common random string model, and H be a collision-intractable hash function family. Let (C uni , P uni , V uni ) be a single-theorem unique non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for R BS . Then the scheme defined in Construction 1 is a secure blind signature scheme.
Proof. We first show unforgeability and then blindness.
Unforgeability. Assume that there exists an adversary U * such that with noticeable probability the following holds. On input crs BS , pk BS the adversary U * manages to output k + 1 valid signatures S i = C i ||PK i ||π i for messages m i after at most k interactions with the honest bank B (and where the pairs (m i , S i ) are pairwise distinct). Given such an adversary we construct a successful adversary A against the security of the signature scheme (KG Sig , Sig, Vf Sig ).
Adversary A is given as input a public key pk Sig of the signature scheme and is granted oracle access to a signature oracle Sig(sk Sig , ·). This adversary first generates crs uni ← C uni (1 n ) for the zero-knowledge proof, crs Com ← C Com (1 n ) for the commitments, picks a hash function H ← H(1 n ) and (pk Enc , sk Enc ) ← KG Enc (1 n ) and sets crs BS ← (crs uni , crs Com , pk Enc ). It next invokes a black-box simulation of U * for input (crs BS , (pk Sig , H)). Each time the user U * initiates the issue protocol with the bank, algorithm A uses the signature oracle to answer the request U by a signature B ← Sig(sk Sig , U ). When the adversary finally outputs the message/signature pairs (m i , S i ) algorithm A parses each S i as S i = C i ||PK i ||π i and decrypts each C i to U i ||B i . Algorithm A outputs the first one of these pairs (U i , B i ) which has not been the result of one of the interactions with the signing oracle (or returns ⊥ if no such pair exist).
For the analysis assume that U * succeeds with noticeable probability. Since k + 1 pairs (m i , S i ) are valid, all the proofs π i in S i = C i ||PK i ||π i are valid as well. Hence, with overwhelming probability over the choice of crs uni each C i is a valid ciphertext of some U i ||B i under pk Enc , and each U i commits to the corresponding message m i and to the hash value of PK i . Moreover, U i also commits to randomness v i with which U i ||B i is encrypted in C i .
Suppose that there exist (U i , B i ) = (U j , B j ) for i = j but such that the two distinct message/signature pairs (m i , C i ||PK i ||π i ) and (m j , C j ||PK j ||π j ) are valid. But then the values U i , U j specify the same unique tuple (m i , H(PK i ), v i ) = (m j , H(PK j ), v j ) and, because of unique openings, also the same randomness u i = u j , and thus C i = C j . We can furthermore assume that no collisions H(PK i ) = H(PK j ) for PK i = PK i for any i, j occur, else this would contradict the collision-resistance of H. Therefore, PK i = PK j and the only place where these message/signature pairs can differ is for π i and π j . But by the uniqueness property of the zero-knowledge proof we conclude that there cannot exist valid proofs π i = π j for the same theorem
and the same witness
with overwhelming probability over the choice of the common random string crs uni . It follows that no such pairs (U i , B i ) = (U j , B j ) for i = j can exist (except for negligible probability). Given that all (U i , B i ) are distinct, we can sort out those among these pairs where the bank has signed U i with B i . Because of the uniqueness of the pairs there must still be one U i left which has not been signed by the bank with B i . Hence, with noticeable probability adversary A produces a (strong) forgery.
Blindness. To prove blindness we consider an adversarial controlled bank B * in experiment Blind BS B * (n). We gradually transform the way the signatures S 0 = C 0 ||PK 0 ||π 0 and S 1 = C 1 ||PK 1 ||π 1 are computed such that, at then end, they are completely independent of bit b.
In the first step we replace all the steps involving the prover by the output of the zeroknowledge simulator. That is, consider the following modified procedures of the blind signature scheme (key generation and verification remain unchanged):
Signature Issue Protocol. For the signature issuing the user now also picks u, v ← {0, 1} n , but lets (PK, SK) ← Z uni (key, σ) instead. The user again sends the commitment U ← Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u) to the bank B * which replies with some B. The user aborts if Vf Sig (pk Sig , U, B) = 1 and else computes C ← Enc(pk Enc , U ||B; v) as well as π ← Z uni (prove, σ, x, SK). Output S ← C||PK||π.
Denote the modified scheme by BS . It follows easily from the zero-knowledge property that experiments Blind BS B * (n) and Blind BS B * (n) return 1 with the same probability (except for a negligible probability).
In the next step we further modify the signature scheme by replacing the commitments U by commitments to all-zero strings. More precisely, we change the signature issue protocol of the blind signature scheme BS as follows (recall that this modified scheme already uses the zero-knowledge simulator to prepare the signatures):
n , sets (PK, SK) ← Z uni (key, σ) as before, but now sends U ← Com(crs Com , 0 2n+h(n) ; u) to the bank to get a signature B (which is also checked). It then computes again C ← Enc(pk Enc , U ||B; v), π ← Z uni (prove, σ, x, SK) and outputs S ← C||PK||π.
We call this modified scheme BS . It is easy to see that, by the secrecy of the commitment scheme, the difference in the output distributions of experiments Blind BS B * (n) and Blind
Finally, we replace the encryption of U and B by an encryption of the all-zero string, i.e., we modify the signature issuing protocol from BS further to obtain:
n as before and again computes (PK, SK) ← Z uni (key, σ) and U ← Com(crs Com , 0 2n+h(n) ; u). For the bank's reply B to U it checks validity and this time sets C ← Enc(pk Enc , 0 c(n)+s(n) ; v), π ← Z uni (prove, σ, x, SK) and outputs S ← C||PK||π.
We call this modified scheme by BS . By the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme we conclude that the difference in the output distributions of experiments Blind BS B * (n) and Blind BS B * (n) is also negligible. In experiment Blind BS B * (n) the signatures S = C||PK||π are independent of the data U, B in the signature generation protocol. Hence, the adversary B * cannot predict b better than with probability 1/2. Conclusively, the probability of the original experiment Blind BS B * (n) to return 1 must be negligibly close to 1/2, proving blindness.
To get a partially blind signature scheme, where the signer and the user share some public information info to be included in the blind signature, we let the bank simply sign the user's commitment U together with info, i.e., B ← Sig(sk, info||U ) and also let the user base the correctness proof π on info. The security proof carries over straightforwardly.
Also, to get a weakly unforgeable blind signature scheme where the malicious user only succeeds when outputting k + 1 distinct messages we can drop the requirement on the strong unforgeability of the bank's signature scheme and use a regular signature scheme guaranteeing basic unforgeability only, and we can also dismiss the requirement on unique randomness for the commitment scheme and merely need statistically-binding commitments. Furthermore, we can then also switch to regular (not necessarily unique) zero-knowledge proofs. The latter implies that the user does not have to pick a public key PK before the first move and that one may think of PK as being the empty string. Consequently, the hash function becomes obsolete and we get such blind signatures under the sole assumption that trapdoor permutations exist.
Universally Composable Blind Signatures
As mentioned, the blind signature scheme in the previous section allows concurrent executions of the signature generation protocol, i.e., when the protocol is interleaved with itself. More generally, one would like to have a guarantee that such a scheme still supports the basic security properties, even when run as a building block within larger protocols, independently how the execution is intertwined with other steps. Such a guarantee is provided by the universal composition (UC) framework [Can01] .
In the UC framework one defines an idealized version of the primitive in question, capturing the desired security properties in an abstract way and ensuring that the functionality is secure in interdependent settings. Given an appropriate formalization of some functionality F in the UC framework, one next shows that this functionality can be securely realized by an interactive protocol between the parties (without the trusted interface). Here, securely realizing means that, in any environment (modeled through an algorithm Z) in which the protocol may be run, for this environment executions of the interactive protocol in presence of an adversary A are indistinguishable from executions in the ideal model with the trustworthy functionality F and an ideal-model adversary S. The UC framework, notably the composition theorem, then ensures that the protocol can indeed be securely deployed as a subroutine in more complex protocols and environments.
A formal introduction to the UC framework is beyond the scope of our paper; we refer to [Can01] to a comprehensive definition. We remark that we consider non-adaptive adversaries here which corrupt parties at the beginning of executions only.
Definition
Our definition of an ideal blind signature functionality F BlSig follows the one F Sig of regular signature schemes given by Canetti [Can04] . The definition of F Sig essentially lets the adversary choose the public verification key and determine the signature value S upon a signing request (Sign, sid, m). Verification requests for previously generated signatures are always accepted and otherwise the adversary is again allowed to specify whether a tested signature S to a message m is valid or not. See [Can04] for a discussion of this definition.
The formal description of the blind signature functionality is given in Figure 2 . It is partly a verbatim copy of the functionality F Sig in [Can04] . An important difference for blind signatures is that the adversary should not learn the message of honest users and the signatures must not be linkable to the signing request. To ensure this we let the adversary (instead of the bank, analogously to the choice of the public verification key in F Sig ) in F BlSig provide (the description of) a stateless, possibly probabilistic algorithm BlSig to the ideal functionality F BlSig . This is already done in the key generation step where the adversary chooses the public verification key, such that BlSig is used in all subsequent signature generation runs. Whenever an honest user later requests a signature for a message m this algorithm BlSig(m) generates a signature S but without disclosing the message m to the adversary, enforcing unlinkability of signatures.
If a corrupt user -that is, the adversary on behalf of the corrupt user-requests a signature, however, the ideal functionality does not run BlSig. Instead it asks the adversary about the potential signature S this user could produce from an interaction with the bank. Note that a corrupt user may not output any signature right after an interaction with the bank (or ever), the interaction merely guarantees that this user can generate this signature in principle. Hence, the functionality does not return the adversary's potential signature S to the user.
Finally, for any signature request we inform the bank B about the request, but without disclosing the actual message m nor the signature. This captures the fact that signature generations require active participation of the bank.
Functionality F BlSig
Key Generation: Upon receiving a value (KeyGen, sid) from a party B, verify that sid = (B, sid ) for some sid . If not, then ignore. Else, hand (KeyGen, sid) to the adversary. Upon receiving (VerificationKey, sid, pk BS , BlSig) from the adversary, output (VerificationKey, sid, pk BS ) to B and record the pair (B, pk BS , BlSig).
Signature Generation: Upon receiving a value (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ) for m ∈ {0, 1} n from some party U, verify that sid = (B, sid ) for some sid . If not, then ignore. Else, do the following:
-If the user U is honest then inform B and the adversary through (Signature, sid) that a signature request takes place and then generate S ← BlSig(m) and output (Signature, sid, m, S) to U. -If the user U is corrupt then send (Sign, sid, m) to the adversary to obtain (Signature, sid, m, S); abort if (m, S, pk BS , 0) has been recorded before. Send (Signature, sid) to B.
In either case record (m, S, pk BS , 1).
Signature Verification: Upon receiving a value (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) from some party P hand (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) to the adversary. Upon receiving (Verified, sid, m, S, φ) from the adversary do:
1. If pk BS = pk BS and the entry (m, S, pk BS , 1) is recorded, then set f = 1 (completeness condition). 2. Else, if pk BS = pk BS , the bank is not corrupt, and no entry (m, S, pk BS , 1) is recorded, then set f = 0 and record the entry (m, S, pk BS , 0) (unforgeability condition). 3. Else, if there is an entry (m, S, pk BS , f ) recorded, then let f = f (consistency condition). 4. Else, let f = φ and record the entry (m, S, pk BS , φ).
Output (Verified, sid, m, S, f ) to P. It follows quite easily that one can realize universally composable commitment schemes in the presence of functionality F BlSig . As a consequence of the hardness of constructing such commitments [CF01,DG03] we conclude: Proposition 2. Bilateral and terminating (i.e., only two parties are active and honest parties faithfully give output) universally composable blind signature schemes securely realizing F BlSig in the plain model do not exist. Furthermore, blind signature schemes securely realizing F BlSig in the common reference string model imply key agreement, and imply oblivious transfer in the common random string model. This all holds for non-adaptive corruptions.
Proof. Given functionality F BlSig we build a universally composable commitment scheme in the F BlSig -hybrid model. The commitment step is as follows. The receiver calls functionality F BlSig with (KeyGen, sid) to generate a public key (VerificationKey, sid, pk BS ). It sends pk BS to the committer. The committer with message m calls functionality F BlSig about (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ) to get a signature (Signature, sid, m, S). This completes the commitment phase. To decommit the committer sends m, S to the receiver who accepts if and only if F BlSig on (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) returns (Verified, sid, m, S, 1) and if it has received at most one notification (Signature, sid).
It is not hard to see that this protocol above implements the universally composable commitment functionality F com . Hence, if there was a bilateral, terminating blind signature protocol for F BlSig then this protocol above would realize functionality F com according to the composition theorem. This, however, contradicts the impossibility result in [CF01] . Moreover, the result in [DG03] about the consequence of protocols realizing F com the common random string model shows that such blind signatures imply key agreement.
By the general feasibility results of Canetti et al. [Can01, CLOS02] functionality F BlSig can be realized in the multi-party setting for honest majorities (in the plain model) and dishonest majorities (in the common random string model). Instead of relying on the general construction in [CLOS02] we construct a simpler two-move scheme in the common reference string model directly, based on the scheme in the previous section.
Construction
The construction in the standard model gives a good starting point for a solution in the UC framework. We augment the scheme by the following steps. First, we let the user in the first round when sending U also encrypt all the data from which the proof is later derived. This ciphertext E should contain the sUNIZK prover's secret SK as well as randomness u, v and message m. The encryption scheme itself needs to be IND-CPA secure and we simply use the same scheme as for the computation for C ← Enc(pk Enc , U ||B; v) but with an independent key pair (pk Enc , sk Enc ).
In addition to the ciphertext E the user should prove with another NIZK proof that the data is valid and matches the data committed to by U . For this we require simulation-sound NIZK proofs [Sah99,DDO
+ 01] where a malicious prover is not able to find an accepted proof for an invalid statement, even if it sees proofs of the zero-knowledge simulator before (possibly for invalid but different theorems):
Simulation-Soundness. A regular NIZK proof (C, P, V) for relation R is called simulationsound if for the zero-knowledge simulator Z and for any efficient algorithm P * the following holds. Let (crs, σ) ← Z(crs, 1 n ) and (x, π) ← P * O (crs), where oracle O for the i-th call x i computes π i ← Z(prove, σ, x i ) and returns π i . Then the probability that V(crs, x, π) = 1 and x / ∈ L R (crs) and (x, π) = (x 1 , π 1 ), (x 2 , π 2 ), . . . is negligible (as a function of n).
In our case here the underlying relation R ss is defined by (a sequence of) circuits C ss n evaluating to 1 if and only if for statement x = U ||E||pk Enc ||crs Com ||crs uni it holds that E = Enc(pk Enc , m||PK||u||SK||v; u ) and U = Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u) and there exist a random string ρ with (PK, SK) ← P uni (key, crs uni ; ρ). Note that the length of the statement as well as the size of the witness are bounded by some fixed polynomial in n, because the length of the data for the sUNIZK proof can be described by a some polynomial in n, c(n), e(n), h(n) and s(n). Such simulation-sound NIZK proofs exist if trapdoor permutations exist [DDO + 01]. The final step is to make the signature algorithm Sig of the bank's strongly unforgeable signature scheme deterministic. This can be accomplished by adding a key of a pseudorandom function to the secret signing key. Each time a signature for U is requested the signing algorithm first applies the pseudorandom function to U to get the randomness s with which the signature B ← Sig(sk Sig , U ; s) is computed deterministically. The advantage of this modification, which does not require an additional complexity assumption, is that identical requests are now also answered identically. For the same consistency reason we also presume that the verification algorithm of the sUNIZK proof is deterministic (as for example in our construction).
n let (PK, SK) ← Puni(key, crsuni; ρ) let U ← Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u) let E ← Enc(pk Enc , m||PK||v||SK||u; u ) let xss ← U ||E||pk Enc ||crs Com ||crsuni let wss ← m||PK||u||SK||v||u ||ρ compute πss ← Pss(crsss, xss, wss) U, E, πss ← −−−−−−−−−− − xss ← U ||E||pk Enc ||crs Com ||crsuni abort if Vss(crsss, xss, πss) = 1 let B ← Sig(sk, U ) We note that our protocol is defined in the common reference string model. In contrast to the case of UC commitments in [CF01] where a fresh common reference string for each commitment through F Com is required, in our case the once generated common reference string can be used for several signature generations by different users; we merely need an independent common reference string for each party taking the role of a bank.
Construction 3 (Universally Composable Blind Signatures). Let (KG Sig , Sig, Vf Sig ) be a signature scheme, (KG Enc , Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme, (C Com , Com) be a commitment scheme, and H be a hash function family. Let (C uni , P uni , V uni ) be a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof system for R BS and let (C ss , P ss , V ss ) be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for R ss . Define the following four procedures: Signature Issue Protocol. If party U is invoked with input (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ) for sid = (B, sid ) it initiates a run of the interactive protocol in Figure 3 with the bank B, where the user gets m and pk BS as input and the bank uses sk BS as input. The user outputs (Signature, sid, m, S) for the derived signature value S.
Signature Verification. If a party receives (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) it parses S as S = C||PK||π, computes φ ← V(crs, PK, x, π) for x = C||pk Enc ||crs Com ||pk Sig ||H(PK)||m and outputs (Verified, sid, m, σ, φ).
Theorem 4. Let (KG Sig , Sig, Vf Sig ) be a length-invariant signature scheme which is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks and for which Sig is deterministic. Let (KG Enc , Enc, Dec) be a length-invariant IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, (C Com , Com) be a length-invariant non-interactive commitment scheme with unique openings in the common reference string model. Also let H be a collision-intractable hash function family and (C uni , P uni , V uni ) be a single-theorem unique non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for R BS with deterministic verifier V uni . Let (C ss , P ss , V ss ) be a (regular) simulation-sound noninteractive zero-knowledge proof for R ss . Then the scheme defined in Construction 3 securely realizes functionality F BlSig for non-adaptive corruptions.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Algorithm BlSig for functionality F BlSig , supposed to be determined by the ideal-model adversary and to create signatures for honest users, ignores its input m entirely, but instead prepares a dummy encryption C ← Enc(pk Enc , 0 c(n)+s(n) ; v) and appends a fake correctness proof PK||π generated by the zero-knowledge simulator. The output C||PK||π is thus indistinguishable from genuinely generated signatures of honest users in the actual scheme. On the other hand, the additional encryption E and the simulationsound zero-knowledge proof allows the ideal-model adversary to extract potential signatures C||PK||π of malicious users (in black-box simulations), and to provide them to the functionality. The completeness and consistency condition of F BlSig is realized by the completeness of the underlying scheme, and unforgeability follows as for the basic scheme with concurrent security.
Proof. (of Theorem 4)
We have to show that for each adversary A attacking the real-world protocol there exist an ideal-model adversary (aka. simulator) S in the ideal world with dummy parties and functionality F BlSig such that no environment Z can distinguish whether it is facing an execution in the real world with A or one in the ideal world with S.
We build the ideal-model adversary S by black-box simulation of A, relaying all communication between the environment Z and the (simulated) adversary A, and acting on behalf of the honest parties in this simulation. Algorithm S also corrupts a dummy party in the ideal model whenever A asks to corrupt the corresponding party in the simulation. By assumption this is only done before the execution starts.
The ideal-model simulator S first generates a reference string crs BS for the black-box simulation by picking encryption keys (sk Enc , pk Enc ), (sk Enc , pk Enc ) ← KG Enc (1 n ), generating crs Com ← C Com (1 n ) and running the zero-knowledge simulators to generates crs ss as well as crs uni for the unique zero-knowledge proof. It outputs crs BS = (pk Enc , pk Enc , crs ss , crs Com , crs uni ). We next describe the simulation of the honest parties in the black-box simulation:
-Suppose the simulator is woken up through a call (KeyGen, sid) from F BlSig in the ideal model where sid = (B, sid'). Then the simulator generates (pk BS , sk BS ) ← KG BS (1 n ) as specified by the scheme's description and lets BlSig be the algorithm that on input m ∈ {0, 1} n computes the encryption C ← Enc(pk Enc , 0 c(n)+s(n) ; v), (PK, SK) ← Z(key, σ) and π through the zero-knowledge simulator for relation R BS where the statement x is defined by x ← C||pk Enc ||crs Com ||pk Sig ||H(PK)||m, and finally outputs S ← C||PK||π. Simulator S returns (VerificationKey, sid, pk BS , BlSig) to F BlSig in the ideal model. In the black-box simulation it sends pk BS to all parties.
-Suppose that the adversary lets a corrupt user in the black-box simulation initiate a protocol run with the honest bank by sending values (U, E, π ss ). Then the simulator first checks the validity of the proof π ss ; if this check fails then it ignores this message. Else, S uses the secret key sk Enc to recover m||PK||v||SK||u from E (and aborts if it fails) and submits (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ) on behalf of the user to the ideal functionality. It immediately receives a request (Signature, sid, m) from F BlSig . To answer, S computes the signature B ← Sig(sk Sig , U ) under the strongly unforgeable signature scheme, an encryption C ← Enc(pk Enc , U ||B; v) and a proof π ← P(crs uni , x, w, SK) for the extracted values and sends (Signature, sid, m, S) for S ← C||PK||π back to the functionality. It also returns B in the black-box simulation to the corrupt user. -If an honest user requests a signature (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ) in the ideal model and waits to receive (Signature, sid, m, S), generated by the functionality through algorithm BlSig, then the ideal-model adversary generates strings U ← Com(crs Com , 0 2n+h(n) ; u), E ← Enc(pk Enc , 0 . . . 0; u ) and a proof π ss via the zero-knowledge simulator of the simulationsound scheme and lets the user in the black-box simulation send these values (U, E, π ss ). If the bank is honest, then S uses the secret signing key sk Sig to compute B ← Sig(sk Sig , U ), else it waits to receive a value B from the adversarial controlled bank.
-If S in the ideal model gets a request (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) then it computes φ ← V(crs, PK, x, π) and returns (Verified, sid, m, S, φ).
This gives a full description of the ideal-model simulator. For the analysis note that there are two main differences between the ideal-model and the black-box simulation compared to an actual attack on the protocol. First, in the black-box simulation we use fake values (commitments and encryptions of zero-strings, simulated proofs etc.). The second point to address is that the verification algorithm in the ideal model returns 0 if there is no recorded pair (m, S, pk BS , 1) while in the real-life protocol Vf BS may output 1; for any other verification requests the answers are identical as the verification algorithm Vf BS merely runs the deter-ministic verification algorithm of the unique NIZK system (and thus guarantees completeness and, especially, consistency). We claim that the differences are undetectable for the environment Z. This is proven through a sequence of games transforming an execution in the ideal-model scenario into one which is equal to the one of the actual protocol. In these games we will have full control over the setting, in particular over the functionality and, in contrast to the ideal-model adversary, we will also read the inputs of Z to honest users. This is admissible since our goal is to emulate Z's environment and to use differences in the output behavior to contradict the security of the underlying cryptographic primitives.
-Experiment Game 0 (n) describes the original attack of Z on the ideal-model simulation (including the black-box simulation of A). -In Game 1 (n) we change the way the commitments U on behalf of honest users are computed in A's black-box simulation. Originally, the simulator S computes a fake commitment U ← Com(crs Com , 0 2n+h(n) ; u). Now, whenever the simulator is supposed to create such a commitment, we let U ← Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u) for the right value m (given as input to the honest user by Z), (PK, SK) generated by the zero-knowledge simulator for the sUNIZK proof and u, v ← {0, 1} n picked at random. Because of the secrecy of Com it is easy to see that Z's output behavior will not change significantly when facing Game 1 (n) instead of Game 0 (n).
-Next, in Game 2 (n), we replace every encryption C ← Enc(pk Enc , 0 c(n)+s(n) ; v) in the computations of algorithm BlSig through an encryption of the actual values U ||B, i.e., C ← Enc(pk Enc , U ||B; v), where we provide the values U and B transmitted in the blackbox simulation "adaptively" to algorithm BlSig. By the security of the encryption scheme this is indistinguishable from the environment's viewpoint. -In Game 3 (n) we replace every steps of the zero-knowledge proof in the computation of BlSig through steps of the actual proof system, i.e., generation of crs uni through crs uni ← C uni (1 n ), and every generation of PK and π through the prover (for the now genuine witness w = u||v||B). By the zero-knowledge property this substitution is (computationally) indistinguishable for the environment Z.
-Now we turn to the difference between the ideal-model verification through list comparisons and the real-life verification through Vf BS . In Game 4 (n) every time the verification algorithm in Game 3 (n) was called by some honest user about input (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) then we run the verification Vf BS (crs BS , pk BS , m, S) instead (the case pk BS = pk BS is treated as before). Consider in Game 3 (n) the event that some user requests the functionality to verify a signature (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) such that there is no entry (m, S, pk BS , 1) stored by the functionality (and the bank B is honest) but such that Vf BS returns 1. This would clearly allow to distinguish the two games (note that the other direction, that Vf BS yields 0 but there is an entry, cannot happen by the completeness of the blind signature scheme). We claim that if such a request should occur with noticeable probability this would contradict the unforgeability of the blind signature scheme in the previous section (there, unforgeability was proven for arbitrary, strongly unforgeable signature scheme for the bank, and thus holds for the deterministic one we consider here as well). Specifically, we show how to turn a run of Game 3 (n) with A and Z into an attack according to experiment Forge BS U * (n). For this we run the same experiment as in Game 3 (n) but this time we are use the oracle access to the bank's signing oracle Sig(sk Sig , ·) instead of generating the key pair (sk Sig , pk Sig ) ourselves (recall that the bank is assumed to be honest). Each time an honest user receives input (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ) we generate U, E, π ss as in Game 3 (n), including a valid commitment U ← Com(crs Com , m||H(PK)||v; u), and submit U to the bank to receive B. From this answer we honestly compute the signature S ← C||PK||π with the help of SK. We memorize the pair (m, S) and the values (U, B). If a corrupt user submits U, E, π ss in the black-box simulation then we also check the proof π ss (and do nothing if it is invalid). If the proof is accepted then we check if we have stored a pair (U, B) for some B. If so, we return the same B as before in the black-box simulation but without contacting the bank in the attack Forge BS U * (n) (since the bank's signature would be identical we answer consistently). If there is no such pair (U, B) we use sk Enc to extract appropriate values m||PK||v||SK||u. By the simulation soundness of the NIZK this extraction works with overwhelming probability (because U has never appeared for an honest user in the execution before). We submit U to the bank's signature oracle to receive a value B, which we return to the corrupt user in the black-box simulation. We also deduce the signature S with the help of the extracted values and record (m, S) and (U, B). Suppose now that a user at some point sends a request (Verify, sid, m, S, pk BS ) for a pair (m, S) which we have not stored but for which Vf BS accepts. Then we immediately stop and output all previously stored k message/signature pairs together with (m, S). Note that this implies that all our k + 1 pairs are accepted by Vf BS , although we only had k interactions with the bank. Hence, if a mismatch in Game 3 (n) happens with noticeable probability it would refute the unforgeability of the blind signature scheme of the previous section. It follows that Game 3 (n) and Game 4 (n) are indistinguishable.
-In Game 5 (n) we can omit the extraction step where the ideal-model simulator decrypts E from submissions of corrupt users, in particular, we do not need to know the secret key sk Enc anymore for the simulation. This is so since the verification now only relies on Vf BS instead of lists. Furthermore every time we gave a dummy encryption E ← Enc(pk Enc , 0 . . . 0; u ) for an honest user, we now encrypt the true values E ← Enc(pk Enc , m||PK||v||SK||u; u ) to prepare the correct values U and C. By the security of the encryption scheme this is indistinguishable for the environment. -In Game 6 (n) we replace the simulation of proofs π ss for honest users through proofs computed by the prover's algorithm for witness m||PK||v||SK||u (with respect to a truly random string crs ss ). The zero-knowledge property ensures that this will not significantly affect the environment's output.
All the steps in the final game now are exactly as in an attack on the real protocol with adversary A. Therefore, the environment's output in the ideal-model simulation (Game 0 (n)) and the real-world execution (Game 6 (n)) are indistinguishable.
Similarly to the case of the underlying blind signature scheme we can weaken the security requirement on the unforgeability and allow a malicious user to be able to generate multiple blind signature for a message. In this case we first have to change the the verification step 2 in the definition of F BlSig as follows:
2. Else, if pk BS = pk BS , the bank is not corrupt, and no entry (m, , pk BS , 1) is recorded, then set f = 0 and record the entry (m, S, pk BS , 0) (unforgeability condition).
As in the case of our concurrently secure scheme we can then assume that the bank's signing algorithm is unforgeable in the weaker sense (but still deterministic) and drop the requirement on the uniqueness of the NIZK proof and remove the hash function. The corresponding scheme then realizes this weaker notion of F BlSig .
Moreover, we can also extend the functionality F BlSig to handle partially blind signatures. For this we let the user provide some public information info together with the message m for signature requests (Sign, sid, m, pk BS ). This information is then forwarded to the adversary and to the bank by the functionality, and we include this information info as part of the maintained records. We can realize this functionality by starting with the partially blind version of our concurrently-secure blind signature scheme and adding the encryption and the simulation-sound proof as before.
A Single-Theorem Unique NIZK Proofs for CircuitSAT
In this section we first recall the definition of unique zero-knowledge from [LMS05] and adapt it to the single-theorem case. We then present our construction of single-theorem unique zeroknowledge proofs. For this we first give the precise definition of such proofs, then describe the construction idea and tools, and finally present the construction and its security.
A.1 Definition
In the definition below we follow the classical approach of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs where a public string crs is available to all parties. Here we use the more general definition of an algorithm C(1 n ) generating this string crs, which is either called the common random string (if crs is a uniformly distributed bit string of polynomial length in n) or the common reference string (if the string has an arbitrary distribution).
Single-theorem UNIZK proofs obey first of all the two basic properties completeness (the verifier V accepts all honestly generated proofs of the prover P) and soundness (no malicious prover can make the verifier accepts proofs for invalid statements). In addition, the proof should be multiple zero-knowledge, i.e., the following two cases are indistinguishable: In the first case each invocation of the prover starts P in mode key to generate a public key PK i , together with a secret key SK i , and then P learns the valid theorem x i and the witness w i and generates the proof π i from x i , w i and SK i in mode prove. In the other case a simulator Z (which is also allowed to generated crs instead of C) like the prover first generates PK i and SK i in mode key but then only gets to see x i (but not the witness) and is supposed to output a proof π i in mode prove. In both cases the parties can be invoked an unbounded, but polynomially number of times.
Uniqueness now says that for each PK, even if maliciously chosen, for any x there exist one and only one proof π for each witness w. This should hold with overwhelming probability over the choice of crs ← C(1 n ). Following [LMS05] we define uniqueness by a bijection between witnesses and valid proofs (if any).
For the sUNIZK proofs we parameterize the underlying N P relation R by the common reference string crs and the public key PK. These parameters are both themselves determined according to a complexity parameter n, and for such parameters R crs,PK takes as inputs x ∈ {0, 1} χ(n) and w ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) , where x, w may depend on crs, PK. Let W crs,PK (x) = w ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) R crs,PK (x, w) = 1 denote the set of witnesses to x with respect to crs and PK, and by L R (crs, PK) = x ∈ {0, 1} χ(n) W crs,PK (x) = ∅ the inputs in the language (for parameters crs, PK).
Definition 4 (Single-Theorem Unique Zero-Knowledge). A single-theorem unique noninteractive zero-knowledge (sUNIZK) proof system for an efficient relation R in the common reference string model is a tuple (C, P, V) of efficient algorithms such that the following holds.
Completeness. For any parameter n ∈ N, any crs ← C(1 n ), any (PK, SK) ← P(key, crs), any (x, w) ∈ R crs,PK and any π ← P(prove, crs, x, w, SK) we have V(crs, x, PK, π) = 1. Soundness. For any efficient algorithm P * the following holds. Let crs ← C(1 n ) and let (PK, x, π) ← P * (crs). Then the probability of V(crs, x, PK, π) = 1 despite x / ∈ L R (crs, PK) is negligible (as a function of n). Zero-Knowledge. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Z such that for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms D the following random variable (as functions of n) are computationally indistinguishable:
-Let crs ← C(1 n ), (PK 1 , SK 1 ) ← P(key, crs) and output d ← D O (crs, PK 1 ), where (stateful) oracle O for the i-th call (x i , w i ) first computes a genuine proof π i ← P(prove, crs, x i , w i , SK i ) if (x i , w i ) ∈ R crs,PKi and sets π i ← ⊥ else, and also computes (PK i+1 , SK i+1 ) ← P(key, crs), and the oracle returns (π i , PK i+1 ).
-Let (crs, σ) ← Z(crs, 1 n ), (PK 1 , SK 1 ) ← Z(key, σ) and output d ← D O (crs, PK 1 ), where (stateful) oracle O for the i-th call (x i , w i ) computes a simulated proof π i ← Z(prove, σ, x i , w i , SK i ) if (x i , w i ) ∈ R crs,PK and sets π i ← ⊥ else, and also computes (PK i+1 , SK i+1 ) ← Z(key, σ), and the oracle returns (π i , PK i+1 ).
If, in addition, C(1 n ) generates uniformly distributed bit strings then the proof is said to be in the common random string model. If the proof system is for an N P-complete relation R then we say that the proof system is for N P. If we drop the requirement for uniqueness then we simply speak of a (regular) non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. Below we present a scheme which is zero-knowledge for a single proof, i.e., where the zero-knowledge property holds with respect to distinguisher D querying oracle O only once. By a well-known technique due to Feige et al. [FLS99] we can turn such proof into a multiple zero-knowledge system assuming the existence of one-way functions. It is not hard to see that this transformation preserves uniqueness (as we will discuss briefly at the end). Since the technique already applies if the starting protocol is witness-indistinguishable instead of zero-knowledge, i.e., Witness Indistinguishability. For any efficient algorithm D the following holds. Let crs ← C(1 n ), (PK, SK) ← P(key, crs), (x, w 0 , w 1 , δ) ← D(crs, PK) such that w 0 , w 1 ∈ W crs,PK (x), b ← {0, 1}, π ← P(prove, crs, x, w b , SK), and d ← D(δ, π). Then the probability that d = b is negligibly close to 1/2. it suffices to prove our protocol to be a single-theorem unique witness-indistinguishable noninteractive proof system.
A.2 Construction Idea
Our solution is influenced by the construction in [BDMP91] and [LMS05] , yet relies on two important differences:
The first difference is to use Damgȧrd's construction [Dam93] based on CircuitSAT instead of relying on the 3SAT protocol of [BDMP91, LMS05] . The CircuitSAT problem is to decide whether a circuit C is satisfiable or not. Switching to this problem gains us an important advantage, based on the N P hardness proof of this problem. Let M be a Turing machine of an N P language L which on input (x, w) verifies that w is a valid witness for x. Then the Karp reduction from L R to CircuitSAT transforms M into a circuit C x with x hardwired into the circuit's description. The circuit C x itself is basically a description of M 's program, mapping inputs w to M 's decision M (x, w) ∈ {0, 1}. Instead of fixing x with C x we now contemplate x to be part of the input, and consider circuit C n (for some bounded input length n) which takes (x, w) as input and computes M (x, w). In particular, C n now depends only on the language L R but not the actual statement. This enables us to build a "scrambled" circuit computation as in [Dam93] before x is actually known. A similar idea has been applied in the case of 3SAT in [DMP88] .
The second important difference, allowing us to base our protocol on general assumptions instead of quadratic residuosity as in [BDMP91, Dam93, LMS05] , is to use an equivocal commitment scheme under general assumptions. Such an equivocal commitment scheme is binding for any (possibly malicious) prover, but allows a simulator to open the commitment in any arbitrary way. This idea is implicit in [BDMP91, Dam93, LMS05] where the prover is given a quadratic non-residue y and commits to a bit b by r 2 y b mod N for random r. If the zero-knowledge simulator chooses y as a square instead then such a commitment can be opened correctly for any value b ∈ {0, 1}.
The same functionality as in the quadratic residuosity construction can be achieved with the equivocal commitment scheme of Di Crescenzo et al. [DIO98] . There, a random string t of length 3n is put in the common random string and the committer chooses a random r ← {0, 1}
n and computes G(r) for b = 0 and G(r) ⊕ t for b = 1, where G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 3n is a one-way function based pseudorandom generator. The simulator simply sets t = G(r 0 )⊕G(r 1 ) and commits by G(r 0 ) such that it can be opened with any value b by disclosing r b . Instead of using a one-way function based generator as in the original scheme here we use one-way permutation based pseudorandom generator, enforcing a unique random string such that a commitment can be opened correctly (as in the quadratic residuosity construction). As sketched before such equivocal commitments can be built from one-way permutations (although each commitment requires a separate part of the common random string):
). Non-interactive equivocal bit commitments with unique openings in the common random string model exist if one-way permutations exist.
A.3 Construction of Unique Zero-Knowledge System
Our construction follows the one by Damgȧrd [Dam93] closely. Yet some slight changes are necessary, due to the fact that we do not use the homomorphic quadratic residuosity 3 → {0, 1} (top), example construction of "scrambled" circuit with some pointers omitted for sake of readability (lower left corner), and proof through decommitments (dark color) for x1 = 0, x2 = 1 and w1 = 1 (lower right corner). encryption scheme. As explained above, we only consider the construction of a witnessindistinguishable proof; zero-knowledge follows from the [FLS99] transformation. We write sUNIZK C for the following proof system. We assume wlog. that the circuit C n : {0, 1} χ(n) × {0, 1} ω(n) → {0, 1} consists of binary NAND gates only (any other complete gate works as well, NAND gates are chosen here for sake of concreteness). We also suppose that each of the G gates, among which are I input gates, is enumerated in some fixed order and that no constant gates exists (these can be easily replaced by using appropriate NAND gates for an input bit). We also assume that there is some fixed order in which the circuit is computed, once the input gates are assigned values.
We remark that the construction below is certainly not optimized; this is in order to simplify the description. A toy example for a circuit C n : {0, 1} 2 × {0, 1} → {0, 1} is given in Figure 4 , with two bits x 1 x 2 for the public input and a single witness bit w 1 . The reader is invited to consult this example in support of the description below.
Generating the Common Random String. The common random string generator C(1 n ) consists of two parts. First it runs the generator C Com (1 n ) of the equivocal commitment scheme 12G + 8G 2 + 6I times to generate strings crs com,i ← C com (1 n ). These strings will be divided by assigning 12 + 8G strings to each of the G gates and 6 additional strings to each of the I input gates. The subdivisions for each gate will become clear below. When saying that the prover commits to a bit it is understood that the prover uses the corresponding string in crs com,i . The second part of the common random string consists of a random string crs C generated for a (possibly ambiguous) non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (C C , P C , V C ) to prove correctness of the scrambled circuit (see below). The combined output equals crs = (crs com , crs C ).
Preparing Keys. To prepare the public key PK the prover first does the following. Figure 4 ). The distinct pointers values are arranged in random order and committed to (since the pointer can be described by a number between 0 and 3 one can commit to this pointer bitwise with two bits). The same is also done for the right input gate where we connect according to the second row of gate i and where we use "right" pointers pp k [i, 1, b]. Since each gate may be connected to other gates as a left or right input (possibly even for the same gate), for each gate j we obtain a G × 2 × 2 matrix pp j of pointers with values from {0, 1, 2, 3}. We denote by pp j this set of pointers of gate j and by Com(pp j ) the commitments.
-It remains to specify how to connect the input gates of the circuit. For an input gate i the prover has already prepared a (committed) truth table Com(tt i ). Then the prover commits to both input possibilities vv i (b) = b ⊕ $ i for a random bit $ i and associates to each of these two commitments a random pointer pp i (b) such that the pointer links the possible input value to the corresponding output value in tt i . -Each unspecified matrix entries are set to 0 and committed to.
The public key PK of the prover now consists of all the commitments of the "scrambled" circuit Com(C n ), plus a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof by P C (with respect to part crs C ) that the circuit is formed correctly. Specifically, this means that each truth table describes a NAND gate, that the pointers are connected correctly, and that for each input gate both input possibilities 0 and 1 are connected correctly to the truth table. We denote this proof by π C . The prover's secret key SK contains all the decommitments to Com(C n ), while PK = (Com(C n ), π C ).
Proving Statements. To prove a statement x = x 1 x 2 . . . x χ(n) ∈ {0, 1} χ(n) for witness w = w 1 w 2 . . . w ω(n) ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) the prover first decommits to the input values in the x-part of the input gate i of circuit C n , i.e., to vv i (b) = x j and to the corresponding pointer pp i (b). The prover also reveals the decommitments of the pointers pp i (b) of the witness bit w j (but not the actual values vv i (b) = w j ). We say that the corresponding gates have been evaluated to
Then, the prover goes through the computation in the prescribed order such that only evaluated gates serve as inputs to other gates. For each NAND gate i with inputs from left gate j and right gate k (possibly j = k) the prover decommits to a pointer pair pp j [i, 0, a], pp k [i, 1, a ] for the input gates j, k such that -gate j has been evaluated to tt j [a, 2] before, i.e., the pointer pp j [i, 0, a] is in the same column as the value of the gate j, and -gate k has been evaluated to tt k [a , 2] before, i.e., the pointer pp k [i, 1, a ] is in the same column as the value of the gate k, and
, a ], i.e., both pointers point to the same column in the truth table of the output gate i.
Finally, the prover opens the commitment of the output gate i for the value tt i [a, 2] it has been evaluated to. The proof π consists of all decommitments of the pointers, the decommitments of the x-input part and of the output gate (see lower right corner in Figure 4 ).
Verifying Proofs. To verify a proof π for statement x with respect to crs = (crs com , crs C ) and public key PK = (Com(C n ), π C ), the verifier checks with V C that π C is correct with respect to crs C , that the decommitment to the circuit's output bit is a valid decommitment to 1, and that all pointers have been opened correctly, i.e., that each outgoing pointer is in the same column as both incoming pointers. If all tests succeed then V returns 1.
Lemma 2. Let (C Com , Com) be a non-interactive equivocal bit commitment scheme with unique openings in the common random string model, let (C C , P C , V C ) be a regular NIZK proofs system for N P, and let C = (C n ) n∈N be a sequence of circuits C n : {0, 1} χ(n) ×{0, 1} ω(n) → {0, 1}. Then the scheme sUNIZK C is a single-theorem unique non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof system for R C = (x, w) ∈ {0, 1} χ(n)+ω(n) C n (x, w) = 1 in the common random string model.
Proof. Completeness is clear. It remains to show soundness, witness indistinguishability and uniqueness.
Soundness. For soundness assume that a malicious prover, on input crs ← C(1 n ), outputs (PK, x, π) such that x / ∈ L R C (crs, PK) but the verifier accepts. Since the verifier tests the proof π C in the key PK (with respect to crs C ) we can assume that the commitments are formed correctly and describe the circuit C n (the cheating probability that this is not the case is negligible by the soundness of the regular NIZK). Since the proof π must contain the opening to x it follows together with the correctness of the commitments that π contains openings to a valid computation of C n (x, w * ) for some w * ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) . Because x / ∈ L R C (crs, PK), however, any w * ∈ {0, 1} ω(n) evaluates to 0 and the proof π cannot contain a valid 1-decommitment to the circuit's output.
Witness Indistinguishability. We show that the distribution of the generated proof does not depend in a significant way on the actual witness. Consider an attacker D on the witness indistinguishability, getting as input a common random string crs and a key PK generated by the prover. The attacker outputs (x, w 0 , w 1 ) and the prover generates π for input (x, w b ) for random bit b, and D tries to predict b through bit d. We denote this experiment by Game 0 (n).
In the sequel we condition on the choice of b = 0 or b = 1. For a fixed bit b consider a slightly modified attack, Game 1 (n), in which instead of generating the circuit's correctness proof π C for random crs C , we now run the zero-knowledge simulator of the regular NIZK to produce the part crs C of the reference string and a simulated proof π C . By the zero-knowledge property of the regular proof system the probability for d = b for fixed b remains negligibly close to the one of the original attack. Hence, for a negligible function ν(n),
Next, in the slightly changed attack, Game 2 (n), we also modify how the prover works. We assume that, instead of using strings crs Com ← C Com (1 n ), we run algorithm EQ to generate all strings crs Com in crs (together with ambiguous openings r 0 , r 1 for each string). Then we let the prover generate the scrambled circuit as before, but each time the prover is supposed to commit to a bit a we compute this commitment as Com(crs Com , a; r a ) for the given values r 0 , r 1 . As in Game 1 (n), the circuit's correctness proof π C is generated by the simulator of the regular NIZK, i.e., without the decommitments. Similar to the previous case it follows from the equivocality that the probability for d = b in this experiment Game 2 (n) is negligibly close to the one in Game 1 (n).
Because of the equivocality of the commitments and the simulation of the circuit's correctness proof the distribution of the prover's data PK and π in Game 2 (n) now is independent of the witness. The probability for d = b is thus exactly 1/2 in this case, and the claim follows for the original attack Game 0 (n).
Uniqueness. Finally, we show that the proof above is unique. We claim that the bijection between proofs and witnesses is defined by the commitments and openings of the witness part. That is, with overwhelming probability the revealed pointers of the witness parts (together with the corresponding value) give rise to a mapping τ crs,PK,x (not necessarily efficiently computable) from proofs to the witnesses.
We call crs com good if there does not exist a commitment with ambiguous openings. This happens with overwhelming probability and from now on we condition on such crs com . We furthermore presume that the scrambled circuit Com(C n ) is correctly formed; this is true for accepted proofs with overwhelming probability (over the choice of crs C ) by the validity of the proof π C . The latter is also implied with overwhelming probability if the set of accepted proofs Π crs,PK (x) is non-empty.
Under the conditions above the openings of the x-part and the pointers for the witness part uniquely determine subsequent openings. Hence, any difference in two valid proofs π = π is due to the opening of the pointers of the witness part. It follows that these proofs describe two distinct witnesses w = w as well. Vice versa, different witnesses entail openings to different pointers and thus to different proofs.
As explained above, we now apply the technique of [FLS99] to go from a witness-indistinguishable proof to a multiple zero-knowledge proof system. For parameter n assume that the witness length ω(n) is super-logaritmic (e.g., by padding all witnesses to n bits) and let (n) = 2 · ω(n). The transformation takes a part crs FLS ∈ {0, 1} (n) of the reference string crs and evaluates the circuit C for a pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1} ω(n) → {0, 1} (n) . Note that the input size of the derived circuit slightly enlarges, but only as a function of n. Also note that our witnessindistinguishable proof system allows dependencies of theorems x of such bounded parts of crs.
For possibly malicious provers the probability that there exist a pre-image of the truly random string crs FLS under G is at most 2 − (n)/2 and thus negligible, preserving soundness as well as uniqueness. On the other hand, the zero-knowledge simulator can now pick crs FLS as the pseudorandom value G(w) for random w and then uses this witness w to give proofs. Hence, we obtain:
Theorem 5. Single-theorem unique non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for N P in the common random string model exist if (regular) non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems for N P in the common random string model and one-way permutations exist.
The theorem holds for both bounded and unbounded provers. For efficient provers it follows that sUNIZK proofs exist if trapdoor permutations exist, and for unbounded provers they can be built from any one-way permutation [FLS99] .
